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Measures adopted to produce greater equality are,
however, exceedingly unsuitable for local authorities. The
smaller the locality the more capricious and ineffectual
are likely to be any efforts it may make to carry out such
a policy. It seems clearly desirable that all such
measures should be applied to the largest possible area,
and that subordinate authorities should be left to act,
like the individual, from motives of self—interest.
Edwin Cannan (1896)
Redistribution is intrinsically a national policy.
George Stigler (1957)
Financial assistance to the poor is a legitimate
responsibility of states and localities.
President Reagan (1982)
This paper addresses the question "Which level of government should
assist the poor?" As the first two epigraphs suggest, one strand of the
literature argues that the central government should assume primary
responsibility for this task [e.g., Oates (1972), Ladd and Doolittle (1982)].
This contention is typically developed along two lines:
(1) The well—being of the poor is of national concern: it is a
national public good in the sense that income levels of the poor enter as
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arguments in the utility functions of the nonpoor. As a result,individual
behavior or "local" programs will involve an externality with the consequence
of suboptimal levels of support.
(2) Even if preferences were such that concern for the poor were
limited to residents of one's own jurisdiction, the potential mobility of the
poor toward areas with comparatively high levels ofassistance would force
individual localities to be excessively parsimonious in their relief programs.
The point here is that:
The mobility of individual economic units among different
localities places fairly narrow limits on the capacity for
local income redistribution.For example, an aggressive
policy to redistribute income from the rich to the poor in a
particular locality may, in the end, simply chase the
relatively wealthy to other jurisdictions and attract those
with low incomes. The likely outcome is a community
homogeneous in poor residents (an unappealing prospect for
most local jurisdictions) [Oates (1977), p. 5].
Not all of the economic literature, however, subscribes to this position [e.g.,
Pauly (1973), Tresh (1981, Ch. 30)]. And, in fact, actual programs for assis-
tance to the poor have often relied heavily on decentralized finance and
administration. Over several centuries under the Poor Laws, England operated a
system of poor relief with basic control at the level of the local parish.More
recently, existing programs in the United States exhibit a wide diversity of
roles for the different levels of government with the Federal Government
providing certain programs, the states and localities others, and with shared3
responsibilityfor some of the major assistance programs (like AFDC). The
institutional structure across these programs is strikingly diverse. This is of
further interest in view of President Reagan's proposal under theNewFederalism
to shift the major responsibility for assistance to the poor away fromthe
central government to the state and local levels.
Our approach in this paper will consist initially of a positive
analysis. Making use of a variant of a simple and useful model of Larry Orr
(1976) with demonstrated explanatory power, we work through a series of con-
ceptual exercises that describe relative levels of cash transfers tothe poor
under various conditions. In these exercises, we find that the mobility of
individuals across jurisdictions is a critical element in determining the
outcome. In particular, we demonstrate that in a partial—equilibrium framework,
the level of assistance varies inversely with the "elasticity of mobility" of
low—income individuals. The extension of the analysis to a general—equilibrium
setting produces some important qualifications to this finding. But using some
numerical simulations, we establish the presumption that with mobile poor the
movement from a centralized to a decentralized system of poor relief is likely
to result in a reduced level of assistance to the poor. Since the
extent of mobility is basically an empirical matter, we next survey recent
research on migration behavior in response to differentials in levels of support
for the poor and on the response of benefit levels to the potential for such
migration. Following a brief digression on the English Poor Laws, we turnin
the final part to the question posed at the beginning of the paper.
1. A Positive Theory of Poor Relief
Our variant of Orr's model is based on the following simplifying
assumptions:4
(1) The nation consists of two kinds of people: the nonpoor (N) and
the poor (P). Within each group, all individuals are identical: they have the
same preferences and the same pre—tax and pre—transfer incomes.
(2) The concern for the poor is expressed as a dependence of the
utility of the nonpoor on post—transfer income levels of the poor:
Y1).1 Here, the utility of a nonpoor individual in
local jurisdiction i depends on his own post—tax income, Y, and on the
post—transfer income of the poor, Y (where Y refers to disposable income).
The poor care only about their own disposable income: U' •U'(Y-).We
shall assume (as indicated by the superscript 1) that the nonpoor care only
about the poor within their own jurisdiction and not elsewhere.
(3) All the poor within a particular jurisdiction receive the same
amount of transfer income.
(4) Transfers within each jurisdiction are financed by equal (lump—
sum) taxes per—capita on the nonpoor.
(5) The median—voter outcome determines the level of taxes and
transfers. The one restriction here is that N1 > P1: the number of nonpoor
(Ni) exceeds the number of poor individuals (Pi). Otherwise, the poor could
pass a measure to transfer all the income of the nonpoor to themselves. Note
that since all the nonpoor have identical tastes and the same pre—tax and
disposable incomes, they will all desire the same level of transfers to the
poor. And since they (by assumption) constitute the majority, we need examine
only the desired outcome of a "representative" nonpoor individual.
I Following Orr, we adopt here the "altruistic" rationale for support for the
poor. There are alternatives. Varian (1980), for example, suggests income
security as a motivation for poor relief: one might support assistance to the
poor as an insurance policy in case one's own income falls to low levels at some
future time. Yet another approach is Peltzman's (1980) vote—maximizing politi—
clan who tries to secure the votes of transfer recipients through redistributive
measures.5
We proceed next to a series of conceptual exercises in which we assume
that assistance to the poor is strictly a local function. In this setting, we
shall examine levels of support for a variety of special cases.
Case I: A Tiebout World. Although it is not strictly legitimate in
terms of our simplified model with no local public goods, it is useful to
envision as one extreme case a Tiebout world in which individuals select their
jurisdiction of residence according to their demand for local public goods
[Tiebout (1956)1. Without expanding the model formally to incorporate such
goods and the taxes to finance them, it is a straightforward matter to posit a
Tiebout outcome in which each jurisdiction contains only people with the same
demand for local public goods. If such goods are normal goods and are financed,
say, by equal cost—sharing, then our Tiebout equilibrium will consist of
income—homogeneous jurisdictions. A jurisdiction will contain either alL
nonpoor or all poor with localities of the former variety providing higher
outputs of local public goods than those of the latter type. The implication of
this outcome for assistance to the poor is clear: there will be none. The
nonpoor have no poor within their jurisdictions to whom to transfer income.
While this is obviously an extreme case, it does call to our attention that
under a system of highly decentralized public finance in which "Tiebout sorting—
out" takes place, the tendency toward income—homogeneous jurisdictions will tend
to reduce the scope for support for the poor [Bradford and Oates (1974)1.
Case II: Immobile individuals with a historically determined pattern
of residence. For this case, we take the distribution of individuals across
jurisdictions as given and fixed by, say, historical circumstances subject only
to the aforementioned condition that Ni (the number of nonpoor persons In the
th jurisdiction) exceeds P1 (the number of poor in i) for all I. It is a6
straightforward exercise to determine the first—order condition governing the
equilibrium level of transfers in each jurisdiction. We simply maximize the
utility of one of the (identical) nonpoor residents.
(1) Max -u(,
subjectto the condition that total receipts by the poor equal aggregate tax
payments by the nonpoor (which can be stated in the form):
(2)i_1L(i_i
pp 1\N N
Equation (2) indicates that the post—transfer income of a poor individual in I
equals his pre—transfer income, Y, plus the total tax payments of the nonpoor
Ni (Y —Y)
divided by the number of poor. It is important to note that
(pi/Ni) is effectively the "price" to a nonpoor individual of raising income
per—capita of the poor by $1.





Equation(3) implies that the nonpoor in i will continue to transfer income to
the poor in i until the marginal utility to the nonpoor of a marginal dollar
of disposable income to themselves equals the marginal utility to the nonpoor
of another dollar transferred to the poor. Note that this latter quantity
depends not only on the income of the poor but on the "effectiveness" of a7
dollar from a nonpoor person in raising the per—capita income of the poor. And
this in turn depends on the relative number of poor and nonpoor in the
jurisdiction. If, for example, the poor are few in number relative to the
nonpoor, then it will be comparatively inexpensive to the nonpoor to raise the
per—capita income of the poor.
Since we have assumed that the nonpoor have identical pre—tax incomes
and tastes across all jurisdictions and, likewise, that the poor have the same
pre—transfer incomes irrespective of location, it follows that the pattern of
assistance to the poor will depend solely on the price (P'/N3-) of raising the
income level of the poor. Figure 1 depicts this outcome. The demand curve for
assistance will be the same in all jurisdictions, but the population mix between
poor and nonpoor will vary. We see in Figure 1 that jurisdiction j with a
relatively large proportion of poor residents will have an effectively higher
price of assistance (P/Ni) to the nonpoor than in jurisdiction i. The level of
assistance to the poor in j (TJ) will, in consequence, be less than in i.
We thus observe for Case II, in spite of equal initial income positions
and tastes, equilibria exhibiting varying patterns of assistance to the poor.
Those poor fortunate enough to be in jurisdictions where they constitute a
relatively small fraction of the population will receive relatively large
transfers as compared to their counterparts in localities where the poor are a
larger proportion of the residents.2
2 Such an outcome, incidentally, could be objected to on grounds of social
justice. As George Stigler (1957) has put it, the redistribution "..
decisionmust be in some sense a national decision, for the proper amount of
redistribution, even if rich and poor were chained to their communities [our
emphasis], could not depend upon the accidents of income composition of a


















Case III: Mobile Poor. For this case, we alter the environment such
that the poor are free to move among jurisdictions in response to any existing
differentials in levels of support.3Consider first the polar case of "perfect
mobility": the poor move without any sort of cost (transport or psychic) among
localities. The only feature of the jurisdiction that matters to the poor is
the level of transfer payments. It is immediately clear that an equilibrium in
this case must involve identical levels of support for the poor in all jurisdic-
tions (at least those with any poor in them); otherwise, there would obviously
be further movement of poor individuals from low—support to high—support
localities.
In order to say more about the character of the equilibrium, we must be
more specific about the behavior of the nonpoor. Suppose that in determining
support levels, the nonpoor respond purely passively and without regard to the
effect of their decisions on the movement of the itinerant poor. At any point
in time, the level of transfers to the poor is that desired by the median voter
based solely on the current number of poor persons in the jurisdiction. In this
instance, it is clear that an equilibrium outcome must be characterized not only
by equal levels of support, but also by the same population mix of poor and
nonpoor in all jurisdictions. Note that if (P1/Ni)(Pi/Ni) for all (i,j),
then the desired level of support by the nonpoor will be the same in all
3 We shall continue toassume that the nonpoor do not move in response to
differentials in assistance programs. This seems reasonable, for as Gramlich
and Laren (1984) observe ". attoday's levels, a 30 percent increase in
average AFDC benefit levels would raise the disposable income of AFDC recipients
approximately this amount, but reduce the disposable income of average income
taxpayers by only one—third of one percent" (pp. 495—6). It would thus seem
that existing differentials in taxation of the nonpoor to finance transfers to
the poor are probably too small to exert much effect in themselves on the
location decisions of the nonpoor.10
localities. This condition :s needed so that there ill be no incentive (1) for
any poor to move or (2) for ny jurisdiction to alter its level of support.
Moreover, such an equilibrium would also be stable. Any jurisdiction
with a relatively high level of support (which in this model can only result
from a comparatively small fraction of the population that is poor) would
experience an influx of poor persons. This would drive up the "price" of
support for the poor (i.e., P/N) and induce a fall in the desired level of
assistance to the poor. Returning to Figure 1, suppose that (PJ/N) and TJ are
the population mix and support level in all other localities. Further, assume
that jurisdiction I initially has a population mix of (p1/NI) which would result
in a decision to provide a support level of T'. With Ti > TJ, there would occur
an influx of poor into i with a consequent rise in (Pa-/N') and fall in T. In
Figure 1, this process would lead to a movement along the D-curve from A to E,
at which point the influx of poor would cease.
However, the assumption of purely myopic behavior by the nonpoor does
not seem very compelling. It would seem more reasonable to assume that the
nonpoor recognize that their choice of support level will have some impact on
the migration decisions of the poor. This makes matters somewhat trickier. Any
decisions on levels of assistance to the poor must now take into consideration
not only the existing number of poor residents in the jurisdiction, but also the
impact of the support level on migration behavior. One thing we can say
unequivocally in this instance: an increase in the number of poor in any
jurisdiction [implying a rise in (P1/N1)] is undesirable from the perspective of
the nonpoor residents ——itreduces their level of utility. This follows
because, in the model, the effect of an increase in (P1/Ni-) is to raise the
"price" to the nonpoor of any given level of assistance per poor person. An11
increase in the fraction of the population that is poor effectively increases
the price of the second argument in the utility function of the nonpoor.
This would suggest that, in general, levels of assistance to the poor
will be less in the presence of mobility than if the poor remained in their
"home" jurisdictions. For in the determination of the level of support, the
nonpoor must now subtract from the utility they derive from a higher level of
assistance to the poor not only the cost to themselves of the transfers to
existing poor residents, but also the cost of the payments to the newly arrived
poor who will migrate in response to the higher support levels [Boadway and
Wildasin (1984), pp. 509—11].
More formally, let us introduce an explicit "migration function," where
the number of poor in a jurisdiction is a function of the level of transfer
payments:
(4) Pf(T) where f'(T) ) 0 and f'
The parameter fl is the elasticity of the migration function.4 We note that
our treatment at this juncture is wholly in partial—equilibrium terms; most
importantly, we are assuming that levels of transfer payments in other juris-
dictions are given and do not change in response to adjustments in T in the
locality under consideration. [More on this later.]
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function, we can
write:
To simplify notation in this section, we have omitted the subscripts and
superscripts identifying the particular jurisdiction. All variables are
understood to refer to the same, say the ith, jurisdiction.12
PT
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where Z/dT a-uN/aT2( 0 by the second—order condition for utility




From (7) and (8), it follows that:
dT
(9) < 013
Equation (9) indicates that the level of transfer payments varies
inversely with the elasticity of the migration function; in a loose sense, it
tells us (as expected) that the greater the potential flow of migrant poor in
response to a change in the level of transfers, the lower will be the juris-
diction's level of support for the poor. This result, however, must be inter-
preted quite carefully. Note that the sign of this derivative is determined
while holding T and P constant; we are effectively rotating the migration
function around some initial values for P and T.
This can be seen in Figure 2, where we have introduced, in addition to
the "demand curve" for transfer payments (D), a migration curve (M). The
M—curve indicates that the number of poor residents (and hence P/N) rises with
the level of support payments.5Note that an equilibrium pattern of payment
levels and poor residents can only occur at the intersection of the D and N
curves ——atpoint A corresponding to the solid curves. If, for example, T )
T, then more poor would enter the jurisdiction pushing down the level of
transfer payments until TT0. In terms of Figure 2, our result in equation
(9) says that if we rotate the N curve about the initial position at point A and
increase the elasticity of the function by making the curve steeper (see N'),
then the equilibrium level of T will fall. This occurs because the demand
function itself depends upon the slope of the migration curve: as N becomes
steeper indicating a greater responsiveness of the poor to payment levels, the
D—curve shifts down (to D' in the diagram) reflecting a lower desired level of
The N—curve in Figure 2 represents the locus of points satisfying the mobility
function described by equation (4). The D—curve corresponds to equation (6):
it is the locus of points satisfying the conditions for utility—maximization of
the non—poor. As is evident from equation (6), the D—curve depends on the


















transfers.The new equilibrium is at B, indicating a fall in support payments from T0
to T'. It is important to be quite precise concerning this interpretation of (9). For
as we shall see in the next section, shifts of the H-curve in one direction may not
yield a predictable effect on the level of support payments.
Case IV: A Two—Jurisdiction, General—Equilibrium Model. In the
preceding, partial—equilibrium case, we determined the level of support for the
poor that maximizes the utility of the nonpoor in a single jurisdiction, while
holding constant transfer payments in all other jurisdictions. This is not,
however, wholly satisfactory, since there will typically exist some interrelation-
ship among levels of support. In Case IV, we examine the properties of a
simple, two—jurisdiction model where we introduce simultaneous utility—maximi-
zation across the two localities. This provides some further insights into the
way in which the degree of mobility of the poor influences the equilibrium
levels of transfer payments.
In the preceding case, we "defined" mobility in terms of a mobility
function. We effectively identified an increase in mobility with an increase in
the parameter i,theelasticity of the mobility function. Higher mobility was
thus associated with more responsiveness in the location decisions of the poor
with respect to the level of support payments. For our two—jurisdiction case,
we shall use a related, but somewhat different, measure of mobility: the "cost"
of moving from one jurisdiction to the other. We understand such moving costs
to include the net costs of all considerations besides transfers. This would
include not only transport costs (e.g., the price of "bus tickets"), but also
the psychic costs of relocation. In addition, moving costs depend upon such
conditions as the length of the residency period before a low—income individual
becomes eligible for support payments. From this latter perspective, the16
Supreme Court decision striking down state residency requirements can be seen as
reducing the cost of relocation.
For the kth poor individual in jurisdiction 1, the decision as to
whether to move to jurisdiction j will depend upon the difference in support
payments relative to moving costs. More formally, individual k will emigrate
from i to j if:
(10)T.-T.>C +a
where a represents a component of moving costs common to all individuals and
C an individual—specific"attachtnent."6A change dci increases moving
costs by dci for each individual. It is changes in this parameter a that we will
use to generate different equilibria at varying levels of moving costs (or,
inversely, at different levels of mobility). If we let F'(C) and p
represent the cumulative distribution function of C and the initial number of
poor in jurisdiction i, then
(11) P1(T3—T',a) p —pii(J_1_)+PF(T1—T—u)
The first term on the RHS of (11) is the initial stock of poor, the second the
number of poor who emigrate from i, and the third the number who come tofrom
the other jurisdiction.
6 C is related to what Grewal and Mathews (1983) have termed the
"locational surplus." This surplus is the "algebraical sum of the net benefits
which a citizen perceives as accruing to him, in terms of his consumption and
production/employment activities as well as his fiscal transactions with
governments, by choosing to remain in his present jurisdiction.rather than
migrating to another jurisdiction" (p.9). In our notation, (C' +
T1—T)is the locational surplus for the kth low—income household in
jurisdiction 1.17
Ifeach jurisdiction takes the other's behavior as given, it will
choose T1 (or TJ) to maximize
(12) U(Y,Y') —U[YN
—T1PI(T3_Ti,a),Y1 +Ti]
Differentiating with respect to T1 and setting the result equal to zero gives
au'a' au1
N N N z E—.—+—--——o a' aT a
N p
Changes in a will then lead to changes in T1 and TJ. These can be either
partial or general equilibrium responses. For a partial equilibrium analysis,
we can differentiate (13) for jurisdiction I with respect to T1- and a, and solve
I. i I
iaz dT . dT+---—da0for —.Fora general equilibrium analysis,
aT'
we differentiate each equation in (13) with respect to T', Ti, and a and solve
the system of equations






for dT'Jdci and dT2/dcx. To label the resulting algebra "tedious" is an under-
statement. Here, we merely outline the solution; details appear in an appedix
available from the authors on request.
Differentiating equation (13) leaves us with three sorts of deriva-
tives: first—partials of the utility function, second— and cross—partials of
the utility function, and derivatives of iwithrespect to its arguments. The
first—partials are, of course, positive. Various combinations of the other
derivatives of the utility function can be signed either from the second—order
conditions from each jurisdiction's maximization of (12) or from strongly—held






The third source of information comes from actually differentiating P1
with respect to its arguments. Most of our conclusions take advantage of the
fact that the sum of P1 and P2 is constant, and that the assumed response of
migration from I to j is based on the linear function (T—T1—). Finally, we
assume that Fl" is non—negative or, equivalently, that the density of C is
rising. For any symmetric density, this holds when less than half the poor are
migrating. Allowing Fi' to be negative introduces an ambiguity into our results
rather than necessarily reversing them; it turns out that increases in o
necessarily correspond to reductions in the elasticity of P with respect to T
only when F" is positive.19
In both the partial— and general—equilibrium contexts, our results are
qualitatively Bimilar. It is helpful for purposes of discussion to order the
jurisdictions in a specific way. An increase in a will reduce both of the
migration flows in equation (11), reducing the number of poor in one jurisdic-
tion and increasing it in the other. Let jurisdiction 1 be the one which has
fewer poor when a increases (i.e., the jurisdiction which has an influx of poor
in the initial equilibrium). One can then show that dT1/da is positive——higher
(lower) mobility costs raise (lower) transfers in jurisdiction 1. However, the
sign of dT2/da is ambiguous. Intuitively, an increase in a makes jurisdiction 2
"poorer" in that fewer poor leave (at fixed levels of T- and Ti). This effect
encourages jurisdiction 2 to reduce T2 in response to an increase in a.
Our two—jurisdiction case thus reveals a further possible outcome. For
the jurisdiction which is on the receiving end of the net migration flow, we
can say unambigously that an increase in the mobility of the poor (i.e., a
reduction in a) will result in a decline in the level of transfer payments.
Increased mobility implies an increased inflow of low—income individuals for any
specified level of transfer payments. The response of the non—poor to this
increase in the potential inflow of transfer recipients will be to lower
support levels. For the other jurisdiction, however, the effect is ambiguous.
Increased mobility implies a greater net outflow of the poor; with fewer poor,
the "price" (P/N) of raising the disposable income of the poor falls. This
effect encourages an increase in the level of transfers and works against the
incentive to reduce payments in response to the higher level of mobility. We
cannot, in general, determine the sign of dT/da for such a jurisdiction.20
More particularly, if we were to limit migration flows to a one—way
movement of the poor from the low—transfer to the high—transfer state, we could
show that the level of transfers would unambiguously decline in the high—support
state but could conceivably either rise or fall in the low—transfer state
(because of the exodus of some of its poor). Gramlich (1985), using a specific
formulation of a model in this spirit with representative values for the
parameters, produces some intriguing results. In his simulation exercises,
increased mobility of the poor results in a dramatically reduced level of
transfers (T) in the high—support state and an increase in T in the low—support
state. Greater mobility of the poor effectively pushes support levels closer
together with a sharp decrease in the average payment across the two juris-
dictions. The decrease in the average payment is an interesting, if perhaps an
unsurprising, finding. We shall present some evidence in the next section
reinforcing this finding. While it is our conjecture that a decrease in the
average payment is probably the "typical" outcome under increased mobility of
the poor, we would note that it is not a proposition that we have been able to
derive as a general result.
Case V: Centralized Versus Decentralized Support for the Poor. Having
examined the effects of mobility of the poor on levels of support under a system
of local poor relief, we turn next to the issue of central interest in this
paper: a comparison of support levels under centralized and decentralized
systems of assistance.
It is helpful at the outset to examine some of the properties of the




where N1 and P1 refer to the number of nonpoor andpoor households,
respectively, in jurisdiction(where i1,2). We retain the assumption
that the nonpoor care only about the well—being of thepoor within their own
jurisdiction. Centralization of support has two effects. First, it equalizes
the price of support for the poor across the two jurisdictions. Under
centralized support, it is as If both jurisdictions had ratios ofpoor to
nonpoor of:









Note that the distribution of the poor across jurisdictions is Irrelevantto the
centralized outcome (even though it remains true that thenonpoor are only
concerned with the poor within their own locality). Since in our simple model
the nonpoor are everywhere identical, they will all desire thesame level of
transfer payments——that corresponding to the price P/N.
Second, by equalizing levels of transfer payments, centralization
eliminates any movement of poor households in response to interjurlsdictional
differentials in support levels. The mobility issue vanishes. Inconsequence,
we effectively determine the equilibrium level of transfer payments by returning
to Figure 1 and finding the point on the demand curve corresponding to a price
of P/N.
Suppose that we take such a point as our initial equilibrium and
consider a shift to a decentralized system of poor relief. In terms ofour
numerical example, jurisdiction 1 will now provide for its ownpoor as will
jurisdiction 2. Decentralization will involve two effects: a price effect and
a mobility effect. The sign of the mobility effect Is unambiguous: as noted22
earlier,each jurisdiction will incorporate into its choice of a level of
transfer payments the prospect that a higher I will, ceteris paribus, result in
a larger number of poor households. This will depress the level of transfers.
The price effect, however, will differ between the two jurisdictions. In our
example, jurisdiction 2 (with a comparatively large fraction of poor residents)
will experience a fall in the "price" of transfer payments to its poor. This
will tend to offset the mobility effect so that the impact of decentralization
on T2 is uncertain. For jurisdiction 1, in contrast, the price of transfers
rises; this reinforces the mobility effect and leads to an unambiguous fall in





where T is the initial level of transfer paymentsunderthe centralized system.






where WI is the fraction of total poor residents residing in jurisdiction I. We
have established that Ti < T0, but since 12 may be less than or greater than
we are unable to demonstrate as a general result that: T < T0.Neverthe-
less, we might expect this to be the "typical case." That is, we might expect
that in most circumstances, the average level of transfer payments under a
decentralized system of assistance to the poor would be less than the average
payment level under a centralized outcome.
To obtain some further sense of these relationships, we have undertaken
some numerical exercises using specific functional forms for our two—jurisdic-
tion case. For these exercises, we have normalized the pre—transfer income to23
thenonpoor at 1.0 and set the pre—transfer income of the poor at 01. We
assumed a utility function of the simplified—CES form:
[
—(l/r)
_N(r) U- Y +bY
where a is the elasticity of substitution between and Y. We
arbitrarily chose five values of a:.33, .67 ,1.0,2.0, and 3.0. For each a,
we picked b so that '/ equalled 0.20 when transfers were provided under a
fully centralized system.
We assumed the moving—cost functions F1(T3_Ti_) to be cumulative—
normal distributions, with variance one and means of 1.2817 and 1.0365, respec-
tively. Thus, in a benchmark world where moving costs are zero and transfers in
the two states are equal, F'•(—1.2817) —.10and F2 =•(—1.0365)—.15[where
$(z) is the standard—normal c.d.f.J. This implies that, in our benchmark case,
the number of poor in each jurisdiction is constant, since F1P1 .10 -60
6 move from 1 to 2 and F2 P2 .15 •406 move from 2 to 1.
The results appear in Table 1. The level of transfers under a central-
ized system is independent of a by construction; b was chosen for each a to
generate this property. The first major result is that when (no mobility),
decentralization can either raise or lower average transfers. When 0<1, the
demand curve in Figure 1 is concave, so that T at P/N.33 (the centralized
solution) exceeds the weighted average of T at P/N .3 and T at P/N .4.
In a centralized system, P/N equals 1/3 and there are no ôP/T terms in the
first—order conditions. As a result,
—P
—
Sincethe left—hand side is fixed at 0.20 and P/N is known, it is easy to solve
for b as a function of a.24
Table1
Transfers Under Centralized and Decentralized Syates
Elasticity of Substitution
.33 .67 1.0 2.0 3.0
Centralized System .09375 .09375 .09375 .09375 .09375
Decentralized
System: a
Ti .10088 .10763 .11458 .13678 .16109
.08203 .07201 .06250 .03684 .01504
T .09334 .09338 .09375 .09681 .10267
Decentralized
System: z0
.09887 .10332 .10771 .12037 .13228
T2 .07986 .06849 .05825 .03278 .01299
T .09126 .08939 .08792 .08534 .0845625
Whenc >1, the reverse i8true.Of course, these comparisons hold for
"large" finite e's as well as the polar case in the table. With immobile poor,
there is thus no presumption in our model that the average level of transfer
payments will be higher or lower under centralized assistance than under
localized support for the poor.
The second major result is that increased mobility reduces transfers in
each state (compare the c and 0 results). This happens for a range of
intermediate values, too, although we cannot show this result need always hold.
Interestingly, our finding that transfers fall in the state with more poor
people contrasts with the implication of the Gramlich—Laren (1984) model [as
developed in Gramlich (1985)1. As noted earlier, Gramlich finds that, in his
simulations, benefits in the poorer state rise. This difference appears to
result from the choice of functional form, especially for the migration func—
tion At any rate, it is the case in both the Gramlich and our simulations
that in the presence of mobility of the poor, average support payments are
lower under a system of local poor relief than under a centralized system of
assistance. The extent of mobility of transfer recipients seems to be of great
importance to the outcome.
8Neglectingmatching grants, the Gramlich—Laren model can be written
in T1
1 (a. + cb in T3) l+cb i
wherec is the price elasticity of demand for T, b is the elasticity of P-
with respect to Ti/Ti, and the a are constant terms reflecting other
influences (see Gramlich, p. 49). The equilibrium levels of transfers are
a1+ cb (a1+ 82) mT 1+2cb
The derivative of in Ti with respect to b is:
c (aj— a)
(1 + 2cb)2
Thus, increased mobility (higher b) reduces transfers in the higher—transfer
state (a > aj), and increases them in the low—transfer state. Note,
however, that the sum of these derivatives must be zero, which is a very strong
a priori restriction.26
2.An Examination of the Evidence
Our theoretical analysis suggests that migration of the poor in
response to differentials in transfers has the potential to depress the levels
of these payments. But is this, in fact, true? Do the poor migrate in order to
receive higher benefits? And do levels of transfer payments respond to such
migration? These are empirical issues that a substantial number of studies have
addressed over the past 15 years. But before exploring the findings of these
studies, it is important to be a bit more explicit about the matters that are
relevant here. We shall organize our discussion around the following two
issues
(1) Is there evidence to indicate that the poor do, in fact, migrate
from low—benefit to high—benefit jurisdictions (and in substantial numbers)?
(2) Can we find any response in the level of transfer payments to such
migration?
This second point is a tricky one. As we shall see, most of the evidence
relates transfer levels to observed migratory behavior; in principle, our models
assume that officials set transfers in response to potential or expected
migration. What really matters here are the perceptions of policy—makers as to
the likely response of the poor to alternative levels of transfers. This is
obviously a somewhat different matter from the relationship of observed trans-
fers to observed migration. [More on this soon.}
We begin with a brief survey of a large number of econometric studies
of migration behavior in the United States. These studies typically relate
migration over some period between states (or, in some instances, metropolitan
areas) to a set of independent variables including measures of per—capita27
income, unemployment rates, etc., in addition to variables indicating welfare
benefits in (or differentials in benefits between) the jurisdictions. Some of
the early studies were quite crude and aggregative [e.g., Gallaway et al.
(1967)]. Using total migration flows, they typically found the welfare—support
variables to be statistically insignificant. It is also worth noting that
several of these studies used migratory data from the 1950's, when payment
levels and differentials were relatively small and various residency require-
ments were in effect. In contrast, many later studies employed more disag—
gregated data on migratory flows for more recent periods. These studies typically
distinguish between white and non—white migration and, in some instances,
between different age groups. And many of them use data from the decade of the
1960's. Ore would have to characterize the findings of these studies as
somewhat mixed. But our survey indicates that the large majority of them find
some evidence of positive net migration of non—white individuals in response to
differentials in welfare benefits [see, for example, Kaun (1970), Cebula et al.
(1973), and Curran (1977)1.
Non—white migration, however, is itself an imperfect proxy measure for
benefit—induced migration. As Gratnlich and Laren (1984) note, only about
one—quarter of non—white families are recipients of AFDC payments, and only
about one—half of AFDC recipients are non—white. It would obviously be prefer-
able to target such migration studies on actual (or potential) welfare red—
pients. Some recent studies have done just this. Southwick (1981) has explored
the migratory patterns of AFDC recipients and finds that benefit levels exert a
strong influence on AFDC immigration. In his "Test 5," for example, Southwick
estimates a "migration" elasticity of 2.5: his Table 5 indicates that a 1028
percentincrease in AFDC benefits will lead to an estimated increase of 25
percent in the in—migration of welfare recipients.9Likewise, Blank (1983),
drawing on micro—data for individual AFDC recipients from the Current Population
Survey, finds that benefit levels (as well as employment opportunities) exert a
significant influence on location decisions. Finally, Gramlich and Laren (1984)
have used two quite different techniques to estimate the migratory response to
benefit levels. The first involves the estimation of a simultaneous—equation
model using pooled time—series and cross—sectional data on state AFDC payments
for 1974—81; the second employs micro data from a subsample of the 1980 Census
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate a "transition matrix"
describing movements among groups of states with differing benefit levels. Both
of these exercises reveal a significant migratory movement of AFDC beneficiaries
from lower to higher benefit states. This movement, incidentally, is not large
in the short—run. Grarnlich and Laren describe it as "sluggish," but over a
longer period, this mobility "can alter the interstate distribution of the AFDC
population substantially" (p. 506).
The evidence thus provides some support for the view that benefit
differentials exert a significant influence on the location decisions of the
poor. But is this migratory response to differentials in support levels
perceived by state and local policy—makers, and do they react by holding
benefits below what they otherwise would be? As we noted earlier, this is a
Southwick's elasticity of migration, incidentally, is not quite the same as the
elasticity of our migration function in the preceding section. For Southwick's
calculations, the elasticity of migration is defined as the percentage change in
the number of poor (not total poor) resulting from a one—percent change
in the level of transfer payments (in this case he monthly AFDC benefit).29
difficultissue to get at empirically. Interestingly, there has been a recog-
nition in the empirical literature that actual migration flows may influence
benefit levels. Cloward and Piven (1968), for example, have argued that the
movement of blacks from the South to northern cities led to an increase in the
political power of blacks in the cities with a consequent expansion of welfare
rolls and benefit levels. The claim here is that actual migration is associated
with increases (not decreases) in welfare benefits, in response to the expanded,
and hence politically more influential, group of transfer recipients. The
first empirical test of this hypothesis is embodied in the estimation of a
two—equation model by Cebula (1974); the model contains one equation explaining
migration flows and a second describing the response of benefit levels to these
flows. In the second equation, Cebula found a direct and significant relation-
ship between the level of benefits and the inflow of non—white migrants.
However, later work casts doubt on these initial findings. Criticizing Cebula's
work, Kumar (1977) has estimated a somewhat different model using Cebula's (and
other) data; he finds no significant impact of migration flows on the level of
assistance payments. Likewise, Curran (1977), in the estimation of a three—
equation model of net immigration of non—whites to SMSA's between 1965 and 1970,
can find no evidence that greater immigration of non—whites leads to higher
welfare payments. And, finally, Southwick (1981), estimating a two—equation
model, finds that migration flows of welfare, recipients do not have a signifi-
cant effect on benefit levels. The evidence, on the whole, does not seem to
support this version of the "bi—directional" hypothesis.
However, as we have indicated, the hypothesis of interest to us is that
potential migration depresses benefit levels. The one attempt to conceptualize30
andmeasure this relationship is the simultaneous—equation model, noted earlier,
by Gramlich and Laren. Their model incorporates explicitly the differential
between own—state and surrounding—state benefit levels and its effect on the
size of the welfare population. This, in turn, enters into the determination of
the level of welfare benefits (which results from utility-maximization of the
decisive voter). Their estimated benefit equation indicates that the "migration
effect [on benefit levels) is strong and significant no matter how the model is
estimated" (p. 499). In short, the greater the potential migration of benefit
recipients, the lower are the support—payment levels predicted by the Gramlich
and Laren equation.
Our reading of the evidence, at this juncture, is that it provides some
support both for the view that there is a migratory response to differentials
in benefit levels and that the reccignition of this migration potential depresses
levels of assistance payments. As Gramlich and Laren (1984) put it, "Our
tentative conclusion is that migration of AFDC beneficiaries does appear to be
an important phenomenon, though only in the very long run. It does appear to be
perceived that way by state legislators, who appear to be very much conditioned
by what other states are doing when they set AFDC benefits" (p. 510).
3. A Digression on the English Poor Laws
Our analysis and some supporting evidence suggest that mobility of the
poor in response to differentials in support is a potentially serious obstacle
to the successful functioning of a system of local finance. This raises the
intriguing question of how England, a relatively small country with short
distances between local parishes, managed to operate a system of local relief31
over several centuries. Although the Elizabethan or Old Poor Law was officially
enacted in 1601, it effectively codified practices that had existed for some
time [Marshall (1968), p. 11]. Under these practices, the basic responsibility
for both the finance and administration of poor relief rested with the parish.
The Old Poor Law required each parish to designate an "Overseer of the Poor"
whose task it was to know all the poor, to administer assistance to them, and to
find work for the unemployed.
The English dealt with the problem of migration by prohibiting it. The
Law of Settlement and Removal of 1662 (which again formalized earlier practices
reaching back at least to the Labour Ordinance of 1349) made it the responsi-
bility of each parish to provide relief for its own, but only its own, poor.
Under the Law, church wardens and overseers were directed to remove to his
"home" parish any newcomer likely to become a burden to his adopted parish
unless the new arrival could give surety that he wouldn't become indigent or
rented property of the value of ten pounds per year or more [Fraser (1976), pp.
26—271. In fact, the history of the Poor Laws is largely an account of efforts
to deny support to, and to deport, the itinerant poor. Cruel instances abound
of whippings, the splitting of families, and the expulsion of widows and unwed
mothers. In a further Act in 1795, the settlement law was amended such that
only those who applied for local relief were subject to removal. Now only the
poor who actually applied for support put themselves in jeopardy of being
removed. The threat of removal proved a powerful force in persuading strange
paupers to conceal their neediness. The settlement and removal provisions were
a cornerstone of the Poor Laws. Even with the enactment of the New Poor Law in
1834 with its attempt to centralize and standardize somewhat the treatment of32
the poor, settlement and removal was left intact; it survived well into the
twentieth century.'°
In addition to the hardship that it worked on the poor, the settlement
law proved quite complex and costly to administer. The removal of a poor person
could involve a long and expensive search to determine the person's most
recently acquired "settlement," sometimes involving extensive litigation with
other parishes. Such litigation could drag on encompassing one parish after
another, until the bill became quite sizeable. "It took seven years for a case
brought by the township of Canton in Yorkshire against Marsden in Lancashire
to be settled, and when the Court of the Queen's Bench finally decided the issue
in 1849, the 142 ratepayers of Canton were left with a legal bill of over 300
pounds't [Fraser (1976), pp. 34—35). Added to this was the cost of actual
removal and transport; Tate (1969, pp. 200) notes that constables on the main
roads sometimes spent the whole of their time transporting paupers.
In view of the cumbersome and expensive character of the English
system, one wonders at its longevity. The laws of settlement and removal, in
particular, were the subject of fierce criticism from various social reformers
and from economists of the stature of Smith and Maithus. The economists opposed
these provisions because they restricted the mobility of labor." However, the
support for maintaining the local system of poor relief was strong. There was
10During the 19th century, an alternative to settlement and removal procedures
became popular. Instead of having a relief applicant and his family returned to
them under a removal order with little prospect of gainful employment, the
parish of settlement sometimes elected to reimburse the parish where the relief
recipient was currently located. As Fraser (1976, pp. 35—36) points out, "A
complex system of inter—parochial and inter—union accountancy sprang up. .
Between1846 and 1859 the Chorlton—on—Medlock Union was reimbursing 36 unions
and parishes, and was at the same time in receipt of payments from about 100
unions or parishes on behalf of their non—resident paupers."
Blaug (1963) and others contend that settlement and removal were not, in
practice, so serious an impediment to labor mobility as was believed by reformers
of the time.33
deep distrust of proposals that would replace local with national financing of
relief. The source of this distrust was largely the concern that effective
control be maintained over recipients and levels of support [Fraser (1976),
pp. 42—431. Local experience and direct contact with poor persons were seen as
necessary to restrict assistance to the truly deserving poor. Moreover, local
funding provided a check on levels of assistance that, some feared, would be
lost under a system of national finance. In short, a national system of poor
relief, it was argued, would lead to a "profusion" of assistance to the poor
that would encompass fradulent recipients and dIscourage work effort.
4. The Normative Issue
Based on our theoretical exercises and our survey of existing empirical
work, what can we say about the question that we posed at the outset of this
paper: Which level of government should provide assistance to the poor? We
noted in the introduction two general lines of argument for vesting a basic
responsibility for this function with the central government. The first is
based on the claim that the income levels of the poor are a national public good
so that transfers to the poor in one jurisdiction effectively benefit the
non—poor throughout the country. It is difficult, however, to muster compelling
evidence to support this contention. Ladd and Doolittle (1982) cite some polls
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that "show that only
15 to 17 percent of the respondents would like the federal government to
withdraw in favor of state and local governments from programs to aid the needy"
(p. 328). From this, Ladd and Doolittle conclude that most people "apparently
believe the federal government has a responsibility to help needy people, which34
inturn suggests that they believe poverty is a national concern" (p. 327).
Others, however, like Pauly (1973), emphasize the spatial dimension of utility
interdependence, arguing for a predominant concern of the non—poor with their
poor neighbors.
This is not an easy issue to resolve. Individuals contribute, for
example, to national (and global) charities to assist the poor, but much (and
perhaps more) of such giving has a la'rgely local focus. Our surmise is that the
most appropriate way to characterize the utility functions of the non—poor would
involve as arguments in these functions weighted levels of income of the poor
with heavier weights attached to the poor in one's own jurisdiction [e.g.,
Boadway and Wildasin (1984), pp. 507—509). But we are hesitant to base the case
for centralization of the income—maintenance function on this conjecture without
more compelling evidence in its support. As Buchanan (1974) puts it, "If a case
for federal—government or national—government redistributive activity is to be
based on the grounds of strict utility interdependence, evidence should be
available to indicate that the sociocultural environment is such that the
effective limits are, indeed, those determined by national boundaries rather
than those more limited in space on the one hand and those more extensive on the
other" (p. 35). In the absence of clear evidence for or against the national
public good argument, we turn to the second argument for a central role in
assistance to the poor.
This second argument is based on migratory behavior. The claim here is
that the potential migration of low—income households in response to support
differentials will depress benefits to suboptimal levels. This contention is
also somewhat tricky. Suppose that we dismiss entirely any utility interdependence35
among individuals in different jurisdictions: the non—poor care only about the
poor within their own locality. We would emphasize that the median—voter
outcome in our earlier models with identical non—poor is not the socially
optimal outcome from the perspective of the maximization of some sort of
social—welfare function. The equilibrium support levels in our model represent
at best a Pareto—efficient outcome viewed exclusively from the perspective of
the non—poor.
To place this point in context, let us return to our Case II, where the
poor are completely immobile. The equilibrium support level in a particular
jurisdiction represents the level for which we can make no non—poor individual
better off without making another non—poor person worse off; it is the Pareto
efficient level of transfers for the group of non—poor residents in the juris-
diction. Were we to take the preferences of the poor into consideration by, for
example, the maximization of some social—welfare function that included the
welfare of all the residents in the jurisdiction, we would presumably determine
an optimal level of transfers that is greater than that based solely on the
preferences of the non—poor. From this perspective, we would argue that the
equilibrium level of support in our Case II is less than the socially optimal
level; we might take it as a lower bound for the optimal level of transfers.
When we move away from Case II, we find that the introduction of our
migration function establishes a pecuniary incentive for jurisdictions to reduce
support levels below those in the immobility case. Moreover, existing empirical
work suggests that this migration potential is significant and does exert a
depressing influence on the level of benefits. Unlike the case of the English
Poor Laws, we cannot suppress this mobility by residency requirements, since36
suchresidency stipulations have been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. We
should thus expect the equilibrium level of transfers to fall below the lower
bound for optimal support levels. The presumption must be that levels of
assistance to the poor under a wholly decentralized system (and in the absence
of residency requirements) will be suboptimal——at least in the absence of other
distortions.
This points to a basic role for the central government in providing for
the poor. But it does not establish the case for an exclusive reliance on
centrally funded and administered assistance programs. As Boadway and Wildasin
(1984, pp. 505—511) argue, one can view this issue as one involving benefit
spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries; a logical response from this
perspective would be a system of matching grants from the central to local
governments to internalize the spillovers. In fact, income—assistance programs
in the United States involve a major role for the central government with a
substantial reliance on matching grants to the states. As Ladd and Doolittle
(1984, pp. 323—327) point out, in 1980 the federal government provided about 74
percent of the funding of public assistance programs in the U.S. Much of this
took the form of matching grants to the states under the AFDC and Medicaid
Programs for which the federal matching share ranged between 50 and 83 percent.
These programs have provided a strong stimulus to levels of benefits. In one
study of the AFDC system, Gramlich (1982) has estimated that the elimination of
the federal matching share would lower benefit levels by an average of about 56
percent.
These studies raise the important and difficult issues of the appropriate
extent of central incentives for expanded local assistance to the poor. How37
generousshould federal matching be and what precise forms should these programs
take?'2 These are hard questions thatgo beyond the scope of this paper. But
it does seem to us that the theoretical analysis and supporting evidence point
to an important role for the central government in these programs. We are left
uneasy with the new Federalism proposal to establish a decentralized system of
assistance to the poor.
1Z
There are a great variety of alternative approaches to structuring an
intergovernmental system of poor relief. For a very useful examination and
discussion of these alternatives, see Gramlich (1982).38
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